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ABSTRACT 
 
We contribute to the experimental literature on primary school students’ cheating behavior by 
studying i) how cheating is influenced by ego depletion; ii) how it correlates with different 
individual factors. We carried out a large-scale, pre-registered experiment in the field of 28 
Hungarian primary schools (126 classrooms) on a voluntary subsample of 1,143 students at 
grade levels 4 to 8. Students’ cheating behavior was measured by the incentivized dice-roll 
experiment. We find suggestive evidence that our light-touch treatment on ego-depletion 
increased students’ deceptive behavior. Cheating behavior correlated weakly with students’ 
individual characteristics. In a multivariate context controlling for between-classroom 
differences, we document that students’ cognitive ability correlated negatively, while their age 
positively, with their cheating behavior. We found students’ social context (their classroom 
belonging) as a more decisive determinant of students’ cheating behavior than individual 
characteristics.  
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Csalás az általános iskolában: Kísérleti bizonyíték az ego 
lemerítés és egyéni tényezők hatásáról 
KELLER TAMÁS – KISS HUBERT JÁNOS – SZÁMADÓ SZABOLCS 
ÖSSZEFOGLALÓ 
Az általános iskolás tanulók csaló viselkedését vizsgáló kísérleti irodalomhoz járulunk hozzá 
azt tanulmányozva, hogy i) a csalást miként befolyásolja az ego lemerítése; ii) a csalás hogyan 
függ össze egyéni tényezőkkel. Egy nagy, előregisztrált kísérletet végeztünk terepen, 28 magyar 
általános iskolában (126 osztályban), 1143 tanuló önkéntes mintáján, akik 4.-8. évfolyamba 
jártak. A csalást ösztönzött dobókocka kísérlettel mértük. Meggyőző bizonyítékot találunk arra, 
hogy a kezelésben használt enyhe ego lemerítés megnövelte a csalást. A csalás gyengén korrelál 
a tanulók egyéni jellemzőivel. Többváltozós elemzésben, melyben figyelembe vettük az 
osztályok közötti különbségeket, azt találjuk, hogy a tanulók kognitív képessége negatívan, míg 
a koruk pozitívan mozog együtt a csalással. További eredmény, hogy a tanulók társas 
környezete (az osztály, amelybe járnak) erősebben meghatározza a csaló viselkedésüket, mint 
az egyéni jellemzőik. 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL: A13,C91,D91 
Kulcsszavak: becsületesség, csalás, egyéni tényezők, ego lemerítés, dobókocka feladat, 
előregisztrált kísérlet 
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Abstract 
 
Cheating has received growing attention from scholars. Besides experiments carried out with 
university students and adults, the cheating behavior of primary school students gained less 
attention. We contribute to the experimental literature on primary school students’ cheating 
behavior by studying i) how cheating is influenced by ego depletion; ii) how it correlates with 
different individual factors. We carried out a large-scale, pre-registered experiment in the field 
of 28 Hungarian primary schools (126 classrooms) on a voluntary subsample of 1,143 students 
at grade levels 4 to 8. Students’ cheating behavior was measured by the incentivized dice-roll 
experiment, which we have modified to track individual students’ dishonest behavior while 
keeping their integrity. We find suggestive evidence that our light-touch treatment on ego-
depletion increased students’ deceptive behavior. Students who received the dice-roll task at 
the end of a 20-minutes long questionnaire cheated more than those who received it at the 
beginning of the questionnaire. Cheating behavior correlated weakly with students’ individual 
characteristics. In a multivariate context controlling for between-classroom differences, we 
document that students’ cognitive ability correlated negatively, while their age positively, with 
their cheating behavior. We found students’ social context (their classroom belonging) as a 
more decisive determinant of students’ cheating behavior than individual characteristics. We 
discuss the implication of our results in light of educational practices and formulate 
recommendations for future research.  
 
Keywords: honesty, cheating, individual factors, ego depletion, dice-roll exercise, pre-
registered experiment 
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I. Introduction 
 
Honesty is considered a valuable and desirable human trait. Yet, while some individuals are 
honest, others are not (DePaulo et al., 1996; Kashy & DePaulo, 1996; Hess & Hagen, 2006). 
Dishonesty can be explained by pro-self or pro-social motives: self-promotion, undermining 
the reputation of competitors (Hess & Hagen, 2006) vs. group-serving lies (Shalvi & De Dreu, 
2014). There is an intense experimental interest in understanding honesty (also referred to as 
truth-telling) or the opposite of it (known as dishonesty, cheating, deception or lying). A well-
established methodology involving experimental games emerged to measure dishonest 
behavior (see Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Rosenbaum et al. 2014, Abeler et al. 2019). 
A key finding of this literature is that while a fraction of the participants in these cheating 
experiments is an unconditional cheater or non-cheater, a considerable share is affected by 
monitoring and psychological cost. In this regard, a fundamental research question is what 
factors determine if an individual is an unrepentant cheater or a virtuous non-cheater. While 
Economics posits that individuals weigh costs and benefits and they behave dishonestly when 
it pays off, we observe that many of us are honest even if being dishonest gives a substantial 
benefit at zero or minimal costs (López-Pérez and Spiegelman 2013, Fischbacher & Föllmi-
Heusi, 2013, Abeler et al. 2019) or are not optimally dishonest (Mazar et al. 2008, Abeler et al. 
2019). Social psychology proposes that honesty is the result of internalizing norms that induce 
psychological costs of acting dishonestly (Abeler et al. 2014).  
Cheating is more than a morally despicable human predisposition. Laboratory experiments 
connected to real field behavior show that dishonesty in laboratory correlates with fare evasion 
(Dai, Galeotti, and Villeval 2018), deceptive market practices (Kröll and Rustagi 2016), and 
fraudulent job absenteeism (Hanna and Wang 2017). Thus cheating, if it remains uncontrolled, 
leads to severe consequences at the social level. 
Meta-analyses on the experimental research body of unethical behavior reveal many 
factors that increase unethical behavior (Belle and Cantarelli 2017; Köbis et al. 2019). For 
example, Gino and Mogilner (2014) show that priming university students with money-related 
words instead of time-related words increased students’ cheating afterward, highlighting that if 
greed is activated, humans tend to incline to behave unethically. In contrast, the willingness to 
maintain a positive (self- and public) image, monitoring, and moral reminders decrease 
dishonesty (Belle and Cantarelli 2017; Köbis et al. 2019). For example, Shu et al. (2012) show 
that university students lied less if they signed an honesty statement at the beginning rather than 
at the end of tasks where they could cheat, indicating that social and moral norms refrain people 
from acting dishonestly. 
Developmental psychologists found (Talwar and Crossman 2011) that while lying in 
early childhood can be seen as part of cognitive development, dishonesty might become a 
problem behavior in late childhood and adolescence, and it even can persist when adolescents 
become adults (Stouthamer-Loeber, 1986; Gervais et al. 2000). Hence, it is of utmost 
importance to investigate who cheats and why at this age to better understand the subsequent 
problem behaviors that stem from it. The arena of primary education is one of the most relevant 
social contexts where students spend a significant amount of time. Thus it is a relevant context 
for studying cheating behavior in late childhood and adolescence.  
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Students’ deceptive behavior in school is a complex phenomenon. It does not restrict 
academic cheating (Bucciol, Cicognani, and Montinari 2020; Mccabe 2015). Students’ 
dishonesty is connected to school misconduct – such as disruptiveness, homework non-
completion, and absenteeism (Cohn and Maréchal 2018) – and to selfish motives (Maggian and 
Villeval 2016).  
We study dishonesty in primary school using an incentivized experiment. As a 
consequence, this paper is closest to field experiments in compulsory education on students’ 
cheating behavior (Alan, Ertac, and Gumren 2019; Bucciol and Piovesan 2011; Cadsby, Song, 
and Yang 2019; Cohn and Maréchal 2018; Glätzle-Rützler and Lergetporer 2015; Maggian and 
Villeval 2016; Maggioni and Rossignoli 2020). This evolving literature is still in its infancy, 
and it is limited in some respects1.  
First, most of the prior scholarship is based on experiments conducted in a few numbers 
of classrooms with a limited geographical variation.2 Thus, this research is potentially restricted 
to students with similar backgrounds. For example, the research by Cohn and Maréchal (2018) 
is based on 162 students from 8 classrooms in 2 schools. Glätzle-Rützler and Lergetporer (2015) 
analyze data of 383 students from 20 different classes in 4 schools, and the research by Alan, 
Ertac, and Gumren (2019) concerns of 720 students from 31 classes in 10 schools. Large-scale 
field experiments are necessary, therefore, with a vast number of classrooms that compass on 
different school environments and cover students with various backgrounds.  
Second, as attested by Table 1, the results of prior experiments among students in 
compulsory education are conflicting on the individual correlates of students’ cheating 
behavior.3 For example, concerning the correlation between students’ cheating behavior and 
their cognitive abilities Alan, Ertac, and Gumren (2019) finds a positive and significant 
correlation, but Cohn and Maréchal (2018) report a negative relationship that fails to be 
significant. Similarly, while Glätzle-Rützler and Lergetporer (2015) show that 16-17 years old 
students cheat less than their 10-11 years old peers, Maggian and Villeval (2016), find a hump-
shaped profile peaking among 9-10-year-olds while Cohn and Maréchal (2018) report no 
relationship between age and cheating.4 The conflicting results call for new tests based on a 
transparent pre-registered design (Nosek et al. 2015). None of these field experiments were pre-
registered. Moreover, based on the existing literature, we attempted to identify the main 
individual factors that may associate with cheating, measure them all and test them all jointly, 
without focusing on one (or some) of them. 
                                                 
1 For a comprehensive overview of the literature of deceptive behavior (not just those conducted in compulsory 
education) see Jacobsen, Fosgaard, and Pascual-Ezama (2018) 
2 Table A1 In the Appendix provides relevant information on the incentivized cheating experiments that are closest 
to our work. 
3 Most of the papers have several specifications, some of them significant, while others not. We focus on the main 
results and classify the finding as significant if there is convincing evidence. 
4 In some cases the difference in findings reported in Table 1 may be due to the fact that the same phenomenon 
can be captured with different proxies. For instance, we interpret as a manifestation of socioeconomic status both 
parental education (Cohn & Maréchal, 2018) and household wealth or income (Maggioni & Rossignoli, 2020; 
Alan et al., 2019). 
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Table 1: Summary of incentivized field experiments with primary school children 
Authors Female Age S.E.S. Altruism 
Delay of 
gratification 
I.Q. / 
ability G.P.A. 
Disruptive 
school 
behavior 
Glätzle-Rützler & Lergetporer (2015)  - / ns  - / **             
Bucciol & Piovesan (2011) nc  + / ns             
Cadsby et al. (2019) nr  - / ***  nr     nr   nr 
Cohn & Maréchal (2018)  - / ***  - / ns  - / ns      - / ns    + / ** 
Maggian & Villeval (2016)  - / * 
inverted U / 
*    - / ***         
Maggioni & Rossignoli (2020)  - / ns  + / ns  - / ns  - / ns      + / **   
Alan et al. (2019)  + / ns    + / *  - / ns nc  + / **     
*/**/*** denote p<0.01/0.05/0.1. 
ns = not significant 
nc = not consistent  
nr = not reported 
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Third, results are mixed in terms of the question of how self-control/ego-depletion leads 
to unethical behavior5. Since resisting temptation and refraining from cheating requires self-
control, depleting students may evoke self-interest and drive the automatic inclination towards 
deceptive behavior (Shalvi, Eldar, and Bereby-Meyer 2012; Tabatabaeian, Dale, and Duran 
2015). Some experiments find support for this idea among university students (Gino et al. 2011; 
Mead et al. 2009). Lying is, however, cognitively more challenging than truth-telling 
(Suchotzki et al. 2017), which serves as a possible contra argument to the ego-depletion 
hypothesis. This argument might explain why evidence from a meta-analysis (Belle and 
Cantarelli 2017) is mixed on the question of how ego-depletion is related to unethical behavior. 
For example, Yam, Reynolds, and Hirsh (2014) show that hungry (and thus depleted) students 
have cheated less for drinks (an unethical behavior that is unrelated to the deprived 
physiological need) than students who have had a full meal within 4 hours prior to the 
experiment. Thus, some experimental evidence challenges existing work on the effects of ego-
depletion and urges new research on this question.  
Fourth, a computerized recording method that allows tracking individual students’ 
dishonest behavior while keeping their integrity of getting caught by their teachers is rare in the 
literature (Glätzle-Rützler and Lergetporer 2015, Maggian and Villeval 2016, Alan et al. 2019) 
and calls for new research. The majority of existing research deployed realistic choice situations 
where students were tempted to cheat to detect students’ deceptive behavior. Students were 
incentivized to cheat by misreporting the outcomes of random events (e.g., coin-flip, dice-roll, 
see: Gerlach, Teodorescu, and Hertwig 2019) where only one particular outcome of the random 
process was rewarded. Since students did the exercise in private in many cases, researchers 
could reveal students’ cheating behavior only at the group level, but students’ individual 
deception remained hidden (Bucciol and Piovesan 2011; Cohn and Maréchal 2018). 
Fifth, almost all prior experiments have been conducted under supervised conditions in 
the school (Alan et al. 2019; Cohn and Maréchal 2018; Glätzle-Rützler and Lergetporer 2015) 
or in summer camps (Bucciol and Piovesan 2011), in some case even in the presence of the 
teachers (Maggian and Villeval 2016). In these social contexts, however, students’ individual 
decisions might be influenced by a socially desired behavior (school climate). Even in the case 
when students do the exercises in private, they might fear that their behavior will be salient to 
teachers or peers. There is a need, therefore, to investigate students’ cheating behavior under 
less supervised conditions. 
Our experiment among Hungarian primary school students addresses these concerns in 
turn. Our voluntary subsample of 1,143 students from 126 classrooms and 28 schools 
(geographical location see Appendix Figure 1) provides a large student population with diverse 
backgrounds (1). We have submitted a detailed pre-analysis plan before receiving the data, 
where we specified our coding decisions and statistical models in advance, which we strictly 
follow throughout the analysis (2). We depleted students’ self-control with a 20 minutes long 
test. We randomized whether students solved this test before or after the cheating exercise. Our 
measure of self-control/ego-depletion is highly relevant in the educational context since 
students are routinely depleted by (even longer) exercise that bears a cognitive load. We provide 
                                                 
5 We are not aware of any study on primary school students that investigates how ego depletion associates with 
cheating. 
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one of the first tests for depleting the primary school students, particularly (3). We have worked 
out a computerized recording method, which enables us to observe individual cheating 
behavior, and we apply this method to the standardly used dice-roll (Fischbacher and Föllmi-
Heusi 2013) exercise (4). We have carried out our experiment in unsupervised circumstances 
since we have surveyed primary school students at home (under legally ordered home-based 
online education)6 with an online application. Thus, students in our sample might not obey the 
desired school behavior, and they were less prone to potential peer-pressure and fear from the 
school consequences of their deceptive behavior (5).7 
Our finding provides suggestive evidence for the ego-depletion hypothesis. Students who 
received the cheating task at the end of the 20 minutes long questionnaire rather than at the 
beginning misreported the number they have rolled by 4.4 percentage points more likely (p = 
0.075), which is a substantial difference compared to the 12% cheating ratio in the control 
group. We found that cheating is negatively associated with students’ abilities measured by a 
grade-specific math test, and it is positively connected to their age. Most of the deployed 
background variables (gender, age, S.E.S., G.P.A., school behavior, altruism, and delay of 
gratification) of students, however, remained uncorrelated to students’ cheating behavior. Thus, 
our finding suggests that students’ cheating behavior is uniformly distributed across different 
social groups and echoes the conclusion of some prior research (Bucciol and Piovesan 2011) 
and calls attention to the more intense study of contextual rather than individual factors. We 
discuss the implication of our findings on ego-depletion in the light of educational practices.  
 
II. Hypotheses 
 
II. 1. Hypothesis I: Ego depletion 
 
We expect that a larger share of participants will cheat in the treatment group where students 
were depleted and answered the cheating task at the end of the 20 minutes-long questionnaire. 
Apart from questions related to the students’ ability in math, the questionnaire included a social 
attitude test to measure altruism and a delay of gratification tasks. The cognitive math test (a 
sample exercise is shown in Figure A1 in the Appendix) is a usual manipulation task in ego-
depletion experiments (Carter et al. 2015). Our delay of gratification task requires resisting the 
temptation of an early reward (to obtain a larger reward later), while in the social attitude tasks, 
respondents are tempted to be selfish.  
Our assumption is grounded in the theory of ego-depletion (Baumeister et al. 1998), 
arguing that self-control is a limited resource and requires effort to exercise, which was 
supported by evidence gained in experiments run (generally) with university students (Gino et 
al. 2011; Mead et al. 2009).  
 
                                                 
6 The Hungarian government decided to close all schools on March 16 due to coronavirus infection and has ordered 
a digital education work schedule, which is essentially homeschooling.  
7 However, we acknowledge that supervision induced by the school environment may have been supplanted by 
parental supervision. In the Discussion we deliberate more on the consequences of the online questionnaire. 
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II. 2. Hypothesis II: Associations of cheating 
 
We test associations between cheating and several pre-registered individual-level predictive 
factors jointly on the data.  
Factor 1: Grade-specific math test. We assume a negative relationship between students’ 
cognitive ability (proxied by grade-specific math test) and their cheating behavior.  
Psychological studies report a negative relationship between cognitive abilities and 
cheating behavior (Shepherd et al. 1971,Thijssen et al. 2017). In experiments conducted by 
economists, however, the relationship between cognitive abilities and cheating is not clear. 
Measuring cognitive abilities by crystallized and fluid intelligence Cohn and Maréchal (2018) 
found that more intelligent students cheated less (negative relationship), however, the 
relationship was not significant. Using the Raven scores Alan, Ertac, and Gumren (2019) 
established a positive relationship between deceptive behavior and cognitive abilities, the 
relationship, however, turned out to be not significant when households’ income status was 
added to the model.  
One might assume a negative correlation between students’ cheating behavior and their 
cognitive ability because: 
a) cognitive abilities correlate positively with factors (S.E.S., school behavior) that 
associate negatively with cheating; 
b) more able students understand better that their cheating will be possibly visible to 
teachers, researchers, etc., and therefore they will cheat less. 
One might, however, assume a positive correlation between students’ cheating behavior 
and their cognitive ability because: 
a) good cognitive abilities help to realize that students can cheat (Ding et al. 2018).  
Our research contributes to this debate. Since more possible mechanisms speak for the 
negative correlation, we assume that students’ cognitive abilities measured by their grade-
specific math test correlate negatively with their cheating behavior. 
Factor 2: Grade-point average (G.P.A.). We assume that cheating associates with worse 
performance in school (negative relationship), contrary to the prior findings of Maggioni and 
Rossignoli (2020), who report that a higher G.P.A. correlated positively with cheating behavior.  
Since cognitive abilities and G.P.A. show a strong positive correlation, the mechanisms 
listed before are at work in this case as well. For example, on survey data Finn and Frone (2004) 
find that cheating is more likely among lower-achieving students.8  
Another possible argument for the negative relationship between cheating and students’ 
G.P.A. is that students who value more their self-image and reputation (those who perform well 
in the school) will probably cheat less. Shaw et al. (2014) and Shaw and Olson (2015) show 
that children act in an appropriate way not only for the sake of doing the right thing but they 
                                                 
8 Such results have been reported also for university students, see for instance Newstead et al. (1996). 
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are also concerned about their reputation. Similarly, Bryan et al. (2013) find that being a cheater 
hurts the self-image.  
 
Factor 3: Socio-economic status (S.E.S.). We assume that higher S.E.S. associates with less 
cheating (negative relationship). The literature does not offer an unambiguous prediction on the 
effect of family background. For instance, Cohn and Maréchal (2018) found no significant 
relationship between parental education and cheating, though the estimated coefficient had a 
negative sign. Alan, Ertac, and Gumren (2019) found, however, a positive link between S.E.S. 
(proxied by household income) and cheating. They show that higher income (reported by the 
teacher about each elementary school student) associates with more cheating.9 Thijssen et al. 
(2017) report that children of lower educated mothers cheated more often.  
Observational literature in psychology (Griffiths 1952, Tuddenham et al. 1974, Achenbach and 
Edelbrock 1981) document a lower prevalence of dishonesty for children and adolescents from 
higher S.E.S. families, speaking for a negative correlation.10 Even though the literature is 
mixed, our impression is that the balance is tilted toward better socio-economic status being 
associated with less cheating.  
Factor 4: Teacher-reported school behavior. We assume that cheating associates with worse 
behavior in school (negative relationship). In line with our hypothesis, Cohn and Marechal 
(2018) found that those students who had good school behavior cheated less. 
Factor 5: Demographic variables. As indicated in our pre-registration plan, we hypothesized 
that girls tend to cheat less, as revealed by Maggian and Villeval (2016) and Cohn and Marechal 
(2018). We have noted, however, that Alan, Ertac, and Gumren (2019) find that girls cheated 
more. We have not pre-specified any hypothesis about the association between students’ age 
and cheating behavior since the prior literature produced mixed results on this question. For 
example, Talwar and Crossman (2011) hypothesize that cheating follows an inverted U-shape 
as a function of age, peaking in elementary school. Indeed, Maggian and Villeval (2016) find a 
hump-shaped profile. However, Glätzle-Rützler and Lergetporer (2015) report a negative 
association between age and cheating since 11th graders (16-17 years old) cheated less than 5th 
graders (10-11 years old).  
Factor 6: Altruism. We assume that altruistic students tend to cheat less (negative 
relationship).11 Maggian and Villeval (2016) and Alan, Ertac, and Gumren (2019) report that 
altruistic students have committed less deceptive behavior, although only the result of Maggian 
and Villeval (2016) is significant. A recent experiment by Kerschbamer et al. (2019) with a 
university subject pool has confirmed this finding.  
Factor 7: Delay of gratification (D.G.). In our pre-analysis plan, we have not specified any 
hypothesis about the relationship between D.G. and cheating. We are aware only of one paper 
that studies the relationship between patience (a concept tightly related to delay-of-
                                                 
9 This paper also calls the attention to the many aspects of family background. Besides family wealth it is often 
proxied by parental education, but also parental styles, effort and expectations can be regarded as part of family 
background. It is not clear how our proxy for family background captures these aspects. 
10 Other studies (Dodge et al., 1994; Boyle and Lipman, 2002) found similar empirical evidence between SES 
and behavioral problems in general. 
11 We use the terms altruism and social attitude in an interchangeable manner throughout the study. 
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gratification) and cheating, and this paper failed to find a significant association (Alan, Ertac, 
and Gumren, 2019).  
 
III. Methods 
 
In February 2020, we have conducted a randomized field experiment among 2898 students 
among 4 to 8-grade students in Hungarian primary schools (which is equivalent to primary and 
middle school in the U.S.) in 148 classrooms and 29 schools to influence students’ school 
behavior. Our initial field experiment was pre-registered in the R.C.T. register of the American 
Economic Association [blinded for review]. 
Our recent pre-registered [blinded for review] experiment surveyed the same students 
with an online survey. The data collection lasted from 18 May to 8 June 2020. Students’ 
participation in the survey was voluntary, and they have filled in the survey at home under 
unsupervised circumstances12. Students filled in a circa 20 minutes long questionnaire that 
contained a 10 minutes long grade-specific math test13, questions on students’ ability to delay 
gratification and altruism, and a “dice-roll” exercise.  
 
III.1. The dice-roll experiment 
 
We developed a modified version of the standardly used dice-roll experiment (Fischbacher and 
Föllmi-Heusi 2013) that allowed us to collect individual data about students’ dishonest behavior 
while keeping the identity hidden. The dice-roll experiment was an online application 
developed by an IT-company and embedded into the online survey. In the dice-roll experiment, 
students were tempted to cheat by real incentivization. All students in the experiment have, in 
fact, received the incentives after the experiment. The dice-roll experiment had the following 
steps: 
1. We created a student-specific preference scale. Before rolling the dice, students were 
asked in the application to rank six different objects according to the subjective value 
that they attached to the particular object. The objects differed in monetary values. The 
wording of the question prompted students that the object they rank as best should be 
the most desirable that they will be happy to receive as a gift14. Figure 1 shows the 
objects (gifts) that students rank-ordered. 
2. Students next rolled the dice virtually, and the application informed them which gift 
they will get15. Their subjective rank-order about the gift appeared again on the screen. 
                                                 
12 Due to the Covid-19 epidemic, schools changed from school-based education to home-based online education, 
therefore, we were not able to conduct the experiment in schools. 
13 Figure A2 in the Appendix shows a math-test example. 
14 “Please rank the items below based on how valuable you find them. The item you consider most valuable should 
be the one you would most like to receive as a gift.” [“Kérlek, rendezd sorrendbe az alábbi tárgyakat az alapján, 
hogy azokat mennyire tartod értékesnek. Az a tárgy, amit a legértékesebbnek tartasz, legyen az, amit a 
legszívesebben kapnál ajándékba”.] 
15 “Based on the number you have rolled, you will receive the following gift that we will deliver to your school” 
[“Dobásod értéke alapján a következő ajándékot fogjuk eljutni Neked az iskoládba”]  
12 
 
For example, if they have rolled one with the dice, the application informed them to 
receive the least desired object that they have chosen.  
3. Students were then asked to enter the number they rolled in the application. We 
tempted students to indicate a higher number than they have rolled since students knew 
that depending on the number they enter, they will receive16 different gifts.  
By using this design, we can detect whether students were honest (they entered the number 
they rolled), or have cheated (they entered a different number than rolled). The application 
stored both the rolled number and the number entered by the students. These two numbers 
might (not) correspond. Examples of possible misreport is hown in Figure A2 in the Appendix.  
 
      
Pencil box Pouch Mug Pen Keyring Badge 
Figure 1: The objects (gifts) used in the dice-roll app as incentives 
 
III.2 Descriptive statistics about the data 
 
In sum, 12.6% of students (N = 144) have indicated a different number (gift) as rolled. We refer 
to these students as those who have cheated, which is our primary outcome variable. The 
incidence of cheating is low but of similar magnitude than in several other studies. Cadsby et 
al. (2019) / Maggian and Villeval (2016) / Maggioni and Rossignoli (2020) report cheating 
levels of 11-29% / 14.4% / 17.6%. 
Among those students who have cheated, the majority (N = 97) have indicated a more 
valuable gift that they have rolled. A smaller share of students (N = 47) has indicated, however, 
a less valuable gift on their individualized preference list. A closer look at this non-rational 
decision reveals that students have usually chosen the pencil box or the pouch: those gifts that 
all students, on average, found the most valuable. Thus, we assume that when students have 
opted for a less valuable gift, they were less mindful of constructing their preference list17. 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of cheating behavior as a function of math test score and 
ego depletion. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the analytic sample.  
                                                 
16 We made clear to students that they would receive the gifts corresponding to the reported number short after the 
data collection ends. About a week after closing data collection, the gifts were delivered to the schools of the 
students where they could recollect it. The fact that students did not receive the reward immediately may have 
affected the decision of the students. 
17 Our secondary outcome counts the extent of the cheating (that we call exaggeration), focusing on the cases 
where students have opted for a more valuable gift on their individualized preference list than they have rolled. 
We have pre-registered, that if for any of the levels of exaggerations (ranging from 0 to 5), we do not have at least 
20 observations, then the number of observations does not allow us to carry out a proper analysis on the outcome. 
For categories 3, 4, and 5, there are less than 20 observations in our data , we refrain, therefore, deriving any further 
conclusion from the results on the secondary outcome called exaggeration. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
 Outcome variables Treatment Individual factors 
 Cheated 
More valuable 
gift(a) 
Less valuable 
gift [fatigue] (a) 
Depleted 
students 
N of 
books 
DG(b Altruism(c) Math test  GPA(d) 
Disruptive 
school beh.(e) 
Girl Age 
Mean 0.126 0.089 0.045 0.690 0 0.807 0.840 0.621 3.737 1.331 0.499 12.82 
SD 0.332 0.284 0.207 0.463 1 0.395 0.367 0.288 0.983 0.382 0.500 1.432 
Min 0 0 0 0 -0.724 0 0 0 1 1 0 9.781 
Max 1 1 1 1 3.226 1 1 1 5 3.375 1 16.32 
N 1143 1096 1046 1143 1106 1143 1143 1143 1127 1025 1143 1143 
Missing % 0 0.0885 0.045 0 3.24 0 0 0 1.4 10.32 0 0 
(a) Missingness is due to the pre-registered decision rule that restricted our analysis on the cases where students have opted for a more/less valuable gift on their individualized 
preference list than they have rolled 
(b We measured students’ ability to delay gratification (D.G.) in a hypothetical choice situation by asking the following question: Imagine that you can choose wristbands, but 
the number of wristbands you can choose depends on when you get them. If you want to get a wristband in your preferred color today, you can choose one. However, if you 
wait until tomorrow, you can choose two wristbands.” Students’ delay-of-gratification will be coded as follows: zero: if students chose immediate gratification; one if students 
have chosen two wristbands 
(c) We measure altruism with the following questions: “Imagine that you are going to the zoo with some of your classmates. One of your classmates has forgotten to bring money 
for the entrance ticket. You have enough money for two entrance tickets. Would you lend your classmate the money for the entrance ticket?” Altruism is binary variable =1 if 
the student lent money and 0 otherwise. The category “I do not know” was be coded as zero 
(d) Students’ G.P.A. refers to the mid-term grades in the academic year 2019/20 (January 2020). It is the average of students’ teacher-reported non-missing grades from core 
subjects (Mathematics, Hungarian grammar, Hungarian literature). Grades are integers between 1 and 5; a larger number means better school performance. 
(e) An index calculated form the mean (instead of the pre-registered sum) of the following eight disruptive school behaviors: teasing others, playing or reading something, being 
noisy, walking around, eating or chewing gum, sending letters, talking or laughing, being late. We have asked the frequency of doing these behaviors by using the following 
scale: 1 = “Never”, 2= “Sometimes”, 3 = “Frequently”, 4 = “Almost always”.  
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Math test-score shows the numbers of exercise students solved correctly out of the four exercises deployed in the 
test. 
Treatment refers to whether students received the cheating task at the end (depleted) or at the beginning (not 
depleted) of the 20-minutes-long questionnaire. 
 
Figure 2: The distribution of cheating behavior as a function of math test score and ego 
depletion 
Appendix Table A1 shows the balance in baseline variables between treated (those who 
received the cheating task at the end of the questionnaire) and control students (received the 
cheating task at the beginning of the questionnaire). For each baseline variables that were 
available before the randomization, we show the raw difference in means between the groups 
of students who received the cheating task at the beginning/end of the questionnaire (Column 
2). We also have calculated the difference (Column 3) after controlling for classroom fixed 
effects of accounting for experimental design18. There is no perfect balance between treated and 
control students since we find a smaller share of girls among the treated students. The imbalance 
is the unintended consequence of the randomization because the randomization-procedure was 
blind to students’ baseline characteristics. The balance test still indicates that all models should 
control for students’ gender. 
 
                                                 
18 We have pre-registered testing the balance on the following variables: gender, age, SES, GPA, teacher-reported 
school-behavior. In addition to these variables, we have tested the balance also on baseline variables collected in 
April 2020. These variables are grade-specific math test, delay of gratification, and altruism. 
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III.3 Empirical analysis 
 
To test the ego-depletion hypothesis, we deploy the following model (EQ1). 
 
𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑐 =  𝛽0 +   𝛽1 × 𝑇𝑠𝑐(+𝛽2𝑠 × 𝑋𝑠𝑐) +  𝜃𝑐  + 𝜀𝑠𝑐   EQ1 
Where 𝑇𝑠𝑐 is a binary variable equal to 1 if student s is in the treated group. We have pre-
registered to deploy no control variables in the regression. We deviate, however, from our pre-
registration and include gender and age as control variables, since we have obtained a not 
perfect balance between treated and control students (see Table A2 in the Appendix).  
 
Test for Hypothesis II.  
 
We use the following models to analyze the correlation between students’ cheating behavior 
and the deployed individual factors: 
𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑐 =  𝛽0 +   𝛽1 × 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑐 +  𝜃𝑐 +  𝜀𝑠𝑐  EQ2 
In eight different models, we substituted 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑐 with the following variables: socio-
economic status; altruism; delay of gratification; cognitive skills; students’ teacher reported 
G.P.A.; students’ teacher reported school behavior; students’ gender, students’ age. We denote 
classroom fixed effects with 𝜃𝑐 and the individual error term with  𝜀𝑠. We have clustered 
standard errors at the school level. 
Next, we test these individual factors jointly. 
. 
In hypothesis II., we test multiple hypotheses. We have pre-registered to consider our 
results as confirmatory if, after the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure19, we receive significant 
results. Otherwise, we l consider our results exploratory, e.g., if our coefficients are significant 
at the 5% significance level. 
 
IV. Results 
 
IV.1.Results concerning Hypothesis I.  
 
                                                 
19
 The Benjamini-Hochberg procedure (Benjamini and Hochberg 1995) uses the following formula: p(i) = a*i/m 
for choosing the critical p-value of the significance test, where p(i) denotes the p-value for the hypothesis with the 
i-th lowest p-value, a is the significance level, m is the total number hypotheses tested. For example, testing eight 
hypotheses for the same outcome and the significance level of 0.05, the critical p-value would be 0.00625 for the 
coefficient with the lowest p-value (0.05* 1/8), which is the same as the Bonferroni correction. For the coefficient 
with the second-lowest p-value, the critical p-value will be 0.0125 (0.05*2/8). For the coefficient with the third-
lowest p-value, the critical p-value will be 0.01875 (0.05*3/8). For the coefficient with the highest p-value, the 
critical p-value will be 0.05 (0.05*8/8). 
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In Table 3, we test whether students’ resistance to temptation can be depleted, and thus, they 
would cheat more if they have solved the cheating task at the end of the 20-minute long 
questionnaire. In column 2 (after controlling for gender to induce balance between treated and 
control groups) find that our treatment indeed has depleted students, and they have cheated 4.4 
percentage point more (p = 0.074) if they have received the cheating task at the end of the 
questionnaire. The corresponding effect size (0.132) speaks for a small effect. The point 
estimation (and level of significance) remain unchanged if we deploy more control variables 
(Columns 3 and 4).  
We conclude that our result is substantially meaningful, even though it is not significant at the 
pre-registered 5% significance level. We employed a light-touch treatment and the share of 
students who cheated in the control group is low (8.8%, as Table 3 shows). Therefore the 4.6 
percentage point difference between the treated and control groups means that the prevalence 
of cheating increases by 52% (4.6/8.8) if students are depleted, which yields a large increase.  
Table 3: Results concerning Hypothesis I – Ego depletion 
 
  (1)a (2)b (3)
c (4)d 
Treated 0.046+ 0.044+ 0.046+ 0.045+ 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) 
Constant 0.094** 0.109** -0.200 -0.314 
 (0.016) (0.020) (0.308) (0.295) 
Observations 1,143 1,143 995 1,143 
R-squared 0.139 0.140 0.148 0.152 
Effect Size 0.138 0.132 0.137 0.135 
Mean in the control group 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Standard errors are clustered at the school level.  
All models include classroom fixed effects 
a The pre-registered model: No control. 
b Controlling for Gender for inducing balance between treated and control groups  
b Controlling for Gender, Age, N of books, G.P.A., Disruptive school behavior. 
c Controlling for Gender, Age, N of books, G.P.A., Disruptive school behavior. The missing values are replaced 
with 0, and separate dummy variables control for missing status 
 
We conducted a post-hoc robustness check to analyze more carefully whether the effect 
we measured in Table 3 is due to the depletion of students’ self-control, or (alternatively) due 
to simple fatigue. To disentangle the effect of (voluntary) cheating from the (involuntary) 
fatigue, we analyzed the positive and negative misreports (the difference between the rolled and 
the reported numbers) separately. Note that the negative misreports are irrational since students 
opted for a less value gift – thus, it might be a sign of fatigue. Column 1 in Table A2 in the 
Appendix reveals no significant difference (β = 0.002; p = 0.915) between the control and 
treated groups when considering the negative misreports (fatigue). We, however, observe a 4.4 
percentage point difference (p = 0.012) in positive misreports between the treated versus control 
groups (Column 3). Treatment, thus, increased the (voluntary) cheating, but not the 
(involuntary) fatigue. Hence, we depleted self-control, but we have not caused fatigue. 
 
IV.2. Results concerning Hypothesis II.  
 
17 
 
Table 4 summarizes the results of Hypothesis II. The first eight columns of the table show the 
pairwise association between cheating and each individual factor, controlling for classroom 
fixed effect as pre-registered. The last two columns show the joint effect of these factors 
(with/without the replacement of missing values).  
As column 1 shows, relative to boys, girls tend to cheat 2.9% percentage-point less (p = 
0.057). Since, on average, 12.6% of students cheated, the effect of students’ gender on cheating 
is substantially meaningful even though the effect size is small (-0.086). The pairwise 
association thus supports the relationship that girls cheat less (Maggian and Villeval, 2016; 
Cohn and Marechal, 2018). In a multivariable context (Column 9), the point-estimation of 
students’ gender, however, becomes slightly smaller and loses its significance (p = 0.185). One 
might assume, therefore, that being a girl might contribute to less cheating since girls, on 
average, have better school behavior, and they earn better grades. In our post-hoc analysis, we 
have not found support for either of these mediations.  
Students’ age (Column 2) provides a positive effect on cheating behavior, meaning that 
older students cheat more (effect size is 0.136). This result conflicts with Glätzle-Rützler and 
Lergetporer (2015), who found the opposite. 
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Table 4: Results concerning Hypothesis II – associations of cheating 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
a 
Girl -0.029+        -0.036+ -0.022 
 (0.014)        (0.020) (0.016) 
Age  0.045*       0.029 0.033+ 
 
 (0.019)       (0.020) (0.019) 
N of books   0.001      0.007 0.008 
 
  (0.012)      (0.017) (0.013) 
Altruism (May 2020)    -0.008     -0.006 -0.005 
 
   (0.028)     (0.034) (0.029) 
DG, (May 2020)     0.008    0.011 0.003 
 
    (0.033)    (0.037) (0.033) 
Math test (May 2020)      
-0.096*   -0.086+ -0.087* 
     (0.036)   (0.048) (0.039) 
G.P.A., (January 2020)       -0.029  -0.012 -0.011 
 
      (0.019)  (0.025) (0.024) 
Disruptive school behavior        0.047 0.024 0.029 
(February 2020)        (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) 
Constant 0.140** -0.454+ 0.125** 0.132** 0.124** 0.185** 0.235** 0.065 -0.156 -0.247 
 (0.007) (0.241) (0.000) (0.023) (0.006) (0.022) (0.070) (0.048) (0.308) (0.292) 
Observations 1,143 1,143 1,106 1,143 1,143 1,143 1,126 1,025 995 1,143 
R-squared 0.136 0.139 0.137 0.135 0.135 0.140 0.141 0.134 0.149 0.153 
Adjusted R-squared 0.029 0.033 0.026 0.028 0.028 0.033 0.032 0.025 0.030 0.038 
Effect Size -0.086 0.136 0.004 -0.023 0.025 -0.288 -0.086 0.141    
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Standard errors are clustered at the school level.  
All models include classroom fixed effects 
a The missing values are replaced with 0, and separate dummy variables control for missing status 
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As hypothesized, those students who have achieved high scores on the grade-specific 
math test have cheated less (Column 6). Students who scored 100% on the grade-specific math 
test have cheated 9.6 percentage-points less than those who scored 0% on the test. Expressed 
in effect size, this is a sizable effect (-0.288). Although the coefficient is significant at p = 0.013 
level, due to the large numbers of tested hypotheses, the point-estimation is not significant at 
the pre-registered 0.00625 level. Therefore, correcting standard errors for multiple testing by 
using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure (Benjamini and Hochberg 1995), we do not have 
confirmatory evidence about the association between students’ achievement on the math test 
and cheating. It is noteworthy that students’ cognitive ability measured by their math test 
becomes only slightly smaller in the multivariate context and remains significant at p = 0.033 
level. These results speak for a substantially important negative association between students’ 
cognitive ability and their cheating behavior. Our result is in contrast with Alan, Ertac, and 
Gumren (2019). 
In our pre-registration plan, we have speculated why students’ math test might negatively 
correlate with their cheating behavior. We have deployed two possible explanations. First, 
students’ cognitive abilities can mediate the effect of their S.E.S. or school behavior, 
particularly. Second, more able students might understand better that their dishonest behavior 
can be visible to their teachers, and the fear of being caught prevents them from cheating. Our 
data do not support any of these assumptions about mediation. The estimated coefficient of 
math test did not change significantly either after controlling for S.E.S. (the change in the 
coefficient of math test = 0.007, p = 0.309) or after controlling (in a separate model) for 
students’ school behavior (change = -0.002, p = 0.478). Students’ cognitive abilities might 
cause, therefore, that they understood better the risk that the online application indeed stores 
the truly rolled number, and thus more able students have cheated less. We could not apply a 
direct test for checking this assumption.  
Students’ S.E.S. measured by the number of books at home (Column 3), their altruism 
measured by the hypothetical lending question (Column 4), their delay of gratification20 
measured in a not-incentivized choice situation (Column 5), their school performance captured 
by the G.P.A. (Column 7), and their teacher-reported school behavior (Column 9) is not 
associated with students’ cheating behavior. These point estimations are close to zero and are 
measured with relatively large standard errors relative to the estimated coefficient. Therefore, 
our results do not corroborate the prior scholarship in this regard.  
 
V. Discussion 
 
In sum, we found that primary school students can be depleted quickly by short light-touch 
exercises, which leads to an increase in their cheating behavior. Furthermore, individual 
                                                 
20 Our nil-result on the association between students’ DG and cheating behavior is not an artifact of the 
measurement. In our February 2020 field experiment, we have measured students’ DG in a real choice situation 
with incentivized questions where students could choose one sticker now or two stickers tomorrow. The 
association between students’ cheating behavior and incentivized DG (ß = -0.005, p = 0.844, N = 962) is 
qualitatively similar to the finding showed in Table 3. 
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characteristics of students give little explanation of why they cheat, emphasizing the importance 
of social and situational over the individual factors.  
Our analysis revealed no relationship in the case of most of the pre-registered individual 
factors (see Table 5). Except for students’ cognitive ability (measured by students’ scores on 
the math test) and age, students’ individual characteristics did not associate with their cheating-
behavior. We conclude, therefore, that the significant findings on some individual factors 
reported in prior research could be context-dependent and ad-hoc. 
We note, however, that in our online experiment, we had limited scope for controlling 
environmental factors (e.g., same speed of Internet, same I.T. device). The limited control may 
result in an increase of noise that could lead to a larger standard error of our estimates. 
Therefore, we are likely to detect the strongest relationships between individual factors and 
students’ cheating behavior. Therefore, students’ age and math test-scores seem to be tightly 
associated with their cheating behavior. 
Our findings support the importance of social (instead of individual) context in students’ 
cheating behavior. The adjusted R-square statistics in Table 3 show that students’ individual 
characteristics net of their classroom belonging (captured by the fixed effects) explain little 
from the variance of cheating. Predicting cheating behavior based on class belonging 
(regression with class dummies), we can explain about 13.5% of the variance. If we include all 
the individual characteristics, then R2 increases by a mere 1.1 percentage point. Therefore 
students’ classroom belonging (and thus their social context) is a more decisive determinant of 
students’ cheating behavior than individual characteristics21.  
 
Table 5. The summary results of the deployed hypothesis 
 
Factor 
 
Hypothesis Assumed 
sign  
Estimated result 
N of books More books =>less cheating Negative No relationship 
D.G. We have not specified any 
hypothesis 
No 
assumption 
No relationship 
Altruism More altruistic attitude => 
less cheating  
Negative No relationship 
Math test Better cognitive abilities => 
less cheating 
Negative Negative 
G.P.A. Good performance in school 
=> less cheating 
Negative No relationship 
Disruptive school 
behavior 
Disruptive school behavior 
in school => less cheating 
Positive No relationship 
Girl Being Girl => less cheating Negative Negative 
(marginally) 
                                                 
21 In two papers (Glätzle-Rützler and Lergetporer 2015, Bucciol and Piovesan 2015) the authors deploy the number 
of siblings (or being a sole child) as a control variable and report negative, but insignificant coefficients. Although 
we did not pre-register it, we investigate if the number of siblings is a relevant factor and find that it is not 
(coefficient: 0.009, p-value= 0.289). Similarly, being a first born is not an important aspect (coefficient: -.006, p-
value= 0.825). 
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mitigated by other 
variables  
Age We have not specified any 
hypothesis 
No 
assumption 
Positive 
 
We find robust evidence that depleted students cheated more (with 4 percentage points) 
than those who were not depleted by our 20 minutes long questionnaire. The estimated 
coefficient is marginally significant (p = 0.075). It becomes, however, significant (p= 0.012) 
when we detach involuntarily fatigue from voluntary cheating in the outcome variable. Overall, 
however, effect size speaks about a small (0.134) effect.  
Putting this result in a context, we note that there is an ongoing debate about the existence 
and size of ego depletion. For instance, Hagger et al. (2016), replicated the findings of prior 
experiments and has found that the size of the ego-depletion effect is not different from zero.22 
In a meta-analysis, Carter et al. (2015) also cast doubts on the general existence of the ego-
depletion effect, once publication bias and small-study effects are properly taken into account.23 
In light of this debate, our result is suggestive evidence that ego-depletion plays an important 
role in cheating behavior.  
Our results on ego-depletion indicate that in terms of cheating, the change of self-control 
is more relevant than its stock. We have noticed that students’ ability to delay gratification (a 
proxy for self-control) does not associate with their cheating behavior (β = -0.008; p = 0.803). 
However, students’ resistance to cheating (again self-control) indeed can be depleted, and they 
cheat more if they are exhausted. The fact that the coefficient of delay of gratification is not 
statistically different from zero suggests that it is not the stock but the change of self-control 
that matters for cheating. 
Our findings have a practical consequence for practitioners of education, who should 
creatively involve tools to decrease depletion and foster encouragement in the daily school 
routine. Note that by depleting students with a relatively short test, we have deployed a light-
touch treatment. In the real school context, students’ resistance to cheating might be depleted 
much more intensively. For example, students are often tested by teacher-written tests at the 
end of the school day after having four or five 45-minutes long lectures. Thus one practical 
consequence of our finding would be to schedule students’ assignments at the beginning of the 
school day in order to minimize their cheating-behavior. 
Our results have an indication for the design of future experiments on students’ cheating 
behavior. More particularly, students’ cheating-behavior should not be combined with various 
other tasks or further experiments since these activities deplete students’ resistance to cheating. 
 
 
                                                 
22 They use the sequential-task paradigm that consists of two subsequent tasks and in the (no-)depletion treatment 
the first task did (not) use up self-control resources of the participants, while the second task was demanding in 
both treatments.  
23 Without considering these biases, studies document a significant ego depletion effect, effect sizes ranging from 
0.24 to 0.3 in case of standardized tests. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure A1. Map of participating schools. 
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Table A1: Balance in the analytical sample – The mean of baseline variables in the control 
group and treated group relative the control group  
 
 Control 
group 
Treated group relative to control group 
N Simple 
difference 
controlling for classroom 
fixed effects(a) 
Girl 0.556 -0.084** -0.078* 1,143 
Age 12.84 -0.023 -0.004 1,143 
N of books 0.038 -0.054 -0.050 1,106 
GPA (January 2020) 3.746 -0.014 -0.008 1,127 
Disruptive school behavior (February 2020) 1.315 0.024 0.012 1,025 
Math test (April 2020) 0.69 -0.022 -0.021 983 
Delay of gratification (April 2020) 0.835 -0.031 -0.035 983 
Altruism (April 2020) 0.848 0.007 0.010 983 
The difference between the means of the treated and control group is calculated with regression analysis. The 
dependent variable was the corresponding variable in the rows of the table, and a dummy variable has marked the 
treatment status (=1 if students are in the treatment group). Standard errors are clustered at the school level 
(a) The regressions deployed classroom fixed-effects. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table A2: Robustness check for Hypothesis I 
 
  
Opted for a less valuable gift 
(probably involuntary fatigue) 
Opted for a more valuable gift 
(probably voluntary cheating) 
(1)a (2)
b (3)c (4)d 
Treated 0.002 0.002 0.044* 0.042* 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) 
Constant 0.045* 0.041* 0.070** 0.068** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
Observations 1,046 1,143 1,096 1,143 
R-squared 0.130 0.118 0.155 0.148 
EffSize 0.010 0.011 0.155 0.149 
Mean in the control group 0.039 0.037 0.053 0.051 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Standard errors are clustered at the school level.  
All models include classroom fixed effects and Gender as a control variable 
The dependent variable: We have recoded the variable measuring the rank differences between the rolled and 
reported number. Positive values indicate the choice for a more valuable gift. Negative numbers indicate the choice 
foe a less valuable gift. The variable ranges from -5 to 5.  
a The coding of dependent variable: (-5/-1 = 1) (0=0) (1/5=missing) 
b The coding of dependent variable: (-5/-1 = 1) (0/5=0) 
c The coding of dependent variable: (1/5 = 1) (0=0) (-5/-1=missing) 
d The coding of dependent variable: (1/5 = 1) (-5/0=0) 
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Table A3: Results concerning Hypothesis I – Ego depletion after removing those who were 
not tempted 
 
  (1)a (2)b (3)
c (4)d 
Treated 0.038 0.036 0.041 0.037 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) 
Constant 953 953 836 953 
 0.165 0.167 0.167 0.176 
Observations 0.113 0.106 0.121 0.108 
R-squared 0.097 0.097 0.097 0.097 
Effect Size 953 953 836 953 
Mean in the control group 0.165 0.167 0.167 0.176 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Standard errors are clustered at the school level.  
All models include classroom fixed effects 
a The pre-registered model: No control. 
b Controlling for Gender for inducing balance between treated and control groups  
b Controlling for Gender, Age, N of books, G.P.A., Disruptive school behavior. 
c Controlling for Gender, Age, N of books, G.P.A., Disruptive school behavior. The missing values are replaced 
with 0, and separate dummy variables control for missing status 
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Table A4: Results concerning Hypothesis II – associations of cheating after removing those who were not tempted 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
a 
Girl -0.037+        -0.042 -0.029 
 (0.020)        (0.025) (0.023) 
Age  0.037+       0.009 0.024 
 
 (0.021)       (0.023) (0.023) 
N of books   -0.003      0.008 0.006 
 
  (0.014)      (0.016) (0.014) 
Altruism (May 2020)    -0.021     -0.024 -0.017 
 
   (0.032)     (0.041) (0.033) 
DG, (May 2020)     0.005    0.009 0.012 
 
    (0.035)    (0.039) (0.036) 
Math test (May 2020)      
-0.092*   -0.086 -0.077+ 
     (0.042)   (0.051) (0.043) 
G.P.A., (January 2020)       -0.031  -0.014 -0.014 
 
      (0.021)  (0.028) (0.027) 
Disruptive school behavior        0.067+ 0.044 0.044 
(February 2020)        (0.038) (0.037) (0.039) 
Constant 0.150** -0.345 0.129** 0.149** 0.127** 0.189** 0.250** 0.047 0.097 -0.116 
 
(0.010) (0.264) (0.000) (0.027) (0.028) (0.026) (0.080) (0.051) (0.365) (0.366) 
Observations 953 953 924 953 953 953 941 860 836 953 
R-squared 0.165 0.166 0.163 0.163 0.163 0.167 0.168 0.158 0.169 0.177 
Adjusted R-squared 0.040 0.041 0.034 0.038 0.037 0.042 0.042 0.030 0.031 0.043 
Effect Size -0.110 0.110 -0.008 -0.062 0.015 -0.273 -0.092 0.195    
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Standard errors are clustered at the school level.  
All models include classroom fixed effects 
a The missing values are replaced with 0, and separate dummy variables control for missing status 
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Figure A1: A sample math exercise from the test of four-graders 
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 Preferred gifts 
Rolled gift 
Chosen 
gift 
Rank of 
rolled 
Rank of 
chosen 
Rank 
difference 
Cheating variable 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 
ID 1 Pouch Pencil box Keyring Mug Badge Pen Mug Mug 4 4 0 0 (not cheated) 
ID 2 Pen Pencil box Pouch Mug Keyring Badge Pencil box Pouch 2 3 -1 
1 (cheated) 
[probably fatigue] 
ID 3 Pencil box Mug Pen Pouch Keyring Badge Badge Pencil box 6 1 5 
1 (cheated) 
[probably voluntary] 
 
Figure A2: Examples for (mis)reporting the rolled gifts 
 
